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1. INTRODUCTION 
A blockcipher is said to have a linear factor if, for all plaintexts and keys, there is a fixed 
non-empty set of key bits whose simultaneous complementation leaves the exclusive-or sum of a 
fixed non-empty set of ciphertext bits unchanged. 
Since it appears infeasible to test all possible combinations of key bits and ciphertext bits 
for DES [NBS 771, we tried to find linear structures in the separate rounds of DES and hoped 
that these structures could be combined to yield a linear factor over the whole cipher. This 
naturally led us to the notion of “sequences of linear factors.” In general, there might be linear 
factors that cannot be derived from sequences of linear factors, but under our assumptions about 
DES (detailed below) it seems that factors for the whole cipher would consist of sequences of fat- 
tors for the individual rounds. Our notion of sequence of linear factors extends that of “per 
round linear factors” introduced by Reeds and ManferdeUi [84]. The essential difference is that 
sequences of linear factors allow different rounds to have different linear factors, while per round 
Linear Factors must remain the same for each round. 
We have given several examples of blockciphers, consisting of consecutive rounds of DES, 
that are vulnerable to a known plaintext attack faster than exhaustive key search. For instance, 
the blockciphers consisting of the 6rst 4, 5 or 6 rounds of DES can be attacked about 219, z9, 
and 22 faster than by exhaustive key search, respectively. The results presented do not work for 
the blockcipher consisting of rounds 1-7 of DES, but for the blockcipher consisting of rounds 2-8 
we can save a factor 2. 
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The attacks considered are of the "meet-in-the-middle" type. Such an attack on a blockci- 
pher composed of R consecutive rounds of DES can be described as follows: Suppose a crypta- 
nalist has a plaintext p and corresponding ciphertext c. For each guessed key k the cryptanalist 
enciphers p with the first S rounds of DES yielding d ,  and deciphers c with the last R - S rounds 
yielding d". If d'=d", the cryptmalist concludes that k is the true key. Considerably less guesses 
for the key are required compared to exhaustive key search when there are i and j such that both 
the j-th bit of d' and thej-th bit of d" are independent of the i-th key bit. By independence we 
mean that for all p, c, and k, the j-th bit of d and the j-th bit of d '  are unchanged when the i-th 
bit of k is complemented. 
Meyer [78] argued that blockciphers consisting of R consecutive rounds of DES can have 
ciphertext bits independent of key bits if and only if R G 4 .  In his arguments he used the 
unproved assumption that between two adjacent rounds of DES no dependencies are cancelled. 
This assumption means that if some output bit of the i-th round is functionally dependent on cer- 
tain input bits for the i-th round and if some of these input bits are functionally dependent on 
the t-th key bit, then that output bit is also dependent on the I-th key bit. Meyer's assumption 
can be considered as a special case of the assumption that linear factors in DES always result 
from sequences of linear factors in the individual rounds. Under this general assumption, we 
show that blockciphers consisting of eight or more consecutive rounds of DES have no linear fac- 
tors, and as a special case, that such ciphers are not subject to the kind of meet-in-the-middle 
attacks described above. 
The next section explains how linear structures can be helpful in cryptanalysis while intro- 
ducing some necessary notation. Subsequent sections consider whether DES with a reduced 
number of rounds has such structures. Potential extensions to more rounds of DES are men- 
tioned in our concluding remarks. 
2. LINEAR STRUCTURES IN BLOCKCIPHERS 
This section gives an overview of various kinds of linear structures which blockciphers can 
have, together with their possible consequences for cryptanalysis. Some of the ideas in this sec- 
tion are included in [Hellman et al 761 and [Reeds and Manferdelli 841. 
Some elementary notation that will allow us to make precise statements in the remainder of 
the paper is now introduced. Let iF2 = (0 , l )  be the finite field of two elements. By F$ we shall 
denote the vector space of n-tuples over F2. Elements of IF; are denoted by bold characters such 
as x or strings xlxz . . x,, with x, EF2, and with the coordinates of x commonly referred to as 
"bits." Elements of the Cartesian product IF;' X . . . XF;' are often denoted by (xi, . . . ,x,), 
where x, €IF; for i = 1, . . . ,r .  When using notions from linear algebra, such as vectors, vector 
spaces, bases, linear mappings, etc. we assume that the underlying field of scalars is F2. In par- 
ticular, the + sign denotes addition of vectors over IF?, sometimes referred to as exclusive-or. If 
A is a linear mapping, then im(A) and ker(A) will denote its image and null space, respectively. 
If 371. is a vector space and if a7L1, . . ,Qr  are subspaces of %, then 2 4t, denotes the smallest 
r 
J = I  
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subspace of GZL containing % I ,  . . . ,Qr .  The subspace of % generated by the set { % : a E A }  is 
denoted by [x, :a 6-41. 
By a blockcipher, we mean a mapping F:9RX5€+6Xm, where %.=F~,X=F~ are the mes- 
sage space and key space respectively, such that for each k E X ,  the mapping F(.,k):%+% is 
invertible. We denote decryption by F-':%xX+9lL, i.e. if cE%,kEX then F-'(c,k) is 
equal to p, where p is the element of % for which F(p,k)=c. Finally, if 
F l ,  . . . ,FR:%XX +% are blockciphers, then the product F=FRFR-I  . . . F1 of F1, . . . ,FA 
is defined as follows: if pE4%,kEX, and if the sequence p1 ,pz, . . . is defined by 
then 
Let F:GnXX+GJR. be a blockLipher, where %=Fy, 'X=F;. If c=F@,k) with 
p=pl . . - p m ,  k = k l  . . . k,,,c=c, . - . c,, then 
c , = f ; @ 1 ; . . , p m , k 1 ; . . , k n )  for i = l ; . . , m ,  (1) 
where thefi:FT +"+F2 are boolean functions. Suppose that there are sets { i l ,  . . . ,is} C_ 
(1, . * . , n } , u l ,  . - . ,J , }C { l , - . . , r n }  suchthat thefunctions&k areindependentof thekey 
bits ki with i different from i l ,  . . . ,is, that is 
This can be written more conveniently as 
Z.=F(p,ic), (2) 
where k=k j ,  . . . ki,, c = c j ,  . . . cj, , F : f f  5 XIF;+F;. 
Suppose that a cryptanalist knows a pair of plaintext and corresponding ciphertext (p,c) of 
F and wants to find the key k from the equation 
c=F(p,k). (3) 
The cryptanalist may use the following method: (i) solve k=k,,  . . . k,, from (2) by exhaustively 
trying all 
different from i 1, . . . ,i3 to zero, computing F@, k) and checking if the correct value of 
appears) and (ii) solve k from (3) by exhaustively trying all k for which k,, , . . . ,k, are equal to 
(a value of k can be tried by extending k to a key k by setting all key bits k, with i 
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the values found in (i). Assuming that in step (i) only one solution is found, the cryptanalist has 
to do about 
2s + 2" -J (4) 
computations of F before finding the key. In general, we may not assume that only one solution 
is found in (i). The number of solutions found in (i) can be reduced if the cryptanalist possesses 
M pairs of corresponding plaintext and ciphertext. Suppose that the cryptanahst has the 
plaintext-ciphertext pairs @*,el), . . . , @ M , c ~ )  and wants to solve the key from 
Instead of doing (i),(ii), the following method may be used: 
(7): try all values fork. If a i is found with F(pl,i)=cl, then check if F(k,i)=&, 
F ( m , k ) = j ,  . . I until some i is found with 
F(p,,k)= c, for i =  I ,  . . . ,M; 
(i): try all values for k for which k j ,  . . . k,* is equal to one of the accepted solutions in (i'). If 
F(pl,k)=cl then check if F@z,k)=c2, F(p3,k)=c3, . . . until F(pi,k)+ci for some i or i = M .  
Accept k as a correct key if F@,,k)=ci for Z =  1, . . . ,M.  
or i = M .  Accept k as a solution if - -  
This algorithm h d s  all keys k with F(p,,k)=c, for i =  1, . . . ,M. In order to estimate the 
expected number of encipherments needed in steps (i'),(ii') we make the following very heuristic 
assumptions: for k = 1, . . . ,r , i = 1, . . . , M  and for al l  wrong values of k=kii  . . . kj, the 
fik(pirk) are mutually independent uniformly distributed random variables on {O,l}; for all j 
different f romi l ,  . . . ,jr, for all i in { 1, . . . , M }  and all wrong values of k thef,(pi,k) are also 
mutually independent uniformly distributed random variables on (0. I}. With these assumptions, 
the expected number of encipherments in step (i') is 
M+(2'-1)(1-2-')x(1+2X2-'+3x2-2't . . . )  
2s < Mf- 
1-2-' 
(where the term M comes from the correct value of k). The expected number of keys which have 
to be tried in step (3) is equal to the product of 2" -'and the expected number of accepted 
values for k in step (i'), namely 
1 2" -' 1 + ( 2 7  - 1)2-*M' I 
Hence the expected number of encipherments in step (ii') is at most 
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M + -' [ 1 C(2' - 1)2-M'j - 11 (1 -2'-")X 
1 1+2X2'-m+3X22('-m)+ . .  - 
Therefore, the expected total number of encipherments is at most 
2n -J + 2 n  - Mr 
1-2'-m 2M+- 2' + 1 - 2 - r  
If Mr >x this is only slightly larger than 2' + 2" -'. 
Suppose that G, H :% X 7i +% are two blockciphers and that F = HG. Suppose that a 
cryptanalist knows a plaintext-ciphertext pair of F, (p,c) say. Instead of solving the unknown key 
k from (3), a cryptanalkt can txy to solve k from 
G@,k) = H -  (c,k). (7) 
Attacks in which k is solved from eq. (7) lnstead of ( 3 )  are called meer-in-the-middle UttQCks. Let 
d'=d'l . . . d', =G@,k). ~ " = C T ' ~  . . . d",=H-l(c,k). Suppose that there are subsets 
( 2 1 ,  . . . ,is} of (1 ,..., n} and 0 ' 1 ,  . . , jr}  of ( 1  ,..., m }  such that 
are functionally independent of the key bits k, with 1 different from I 
there are boolean functions g1, . . . ,g, , h 1, . . . ,hr such that 
* . ,&,, CJ,, . . . ,PJ, 
. . . ,is. In other words, 
Nowtheunknownkeykcanbefoundbyfirstsolvingk,,,  . ' . , k , ,  fromgl=hl,  a.. ,g,=h,and 
then solving the remaining key bits from (3) or (7). If the cryptanalist has M plaintext-ciphertext 
pairs, the number of G,H- '  computations needed is given by (6). 
We now consider linear structures more general than independencies of ciphertext bits or 
"bits in the middle" from key bits. Suppose that A : IF~- .F~,B:F~-+F$ are surjective linear m p -  
pings and that there exists a function such that 
AF(p,k)=F(p,Bk) for p ~ % ,  kE3C. (9) 
Given a known plaintextciphertext pair (p,c) it is possible to solve the unknown key k from 
c=F(p,k) by firstly solving from A c = F ( p , i )  and secondly solving k from c=F(p,k), under the 
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restriction that A k = k .  Using that im(A) has cardinality 2’ while the equation A k = i  has 2”-’ 
solutions, a cryptanalist having M plaintext-ciphertext pairs can find the key in a number of enci- 
pherments which is given by (6). 
The linear structures which can be used in a meet-in-the-middle attack are more general 
than those explained above. Such structures exist if there are blockciphers G,H with F = HG, 
surjective h e x  mappings A : ~ T - & ~ , B : I F ~ + F $  and functions G,H, such that for 
p,cE%,kECJC, 
- -  
As mentioned in the introduction, given a blockcipher F, it might be infeasible to find out 
if it has any linear factors. Instead of this, one might try to represent F as a product of crypto- 
graphically weak blockciphers and check i f  these weak blockciphers themselves have such linear 
structures. Suppose that F1, . . . ,FR: 31tX3c+4m are blockciphers and that F=FR . . - P I .  
Let Ai (i =O, . . , R )  be linear mappings on 3R. and let B be a linear mapping on 3c. We call 
( A o ,  . . . ,AR;B) a sequence of linear factors for F (with respect to F , ,  . . . ,FR) if  there are func- 
tions F, (i =0, . . . ,R): i ~ n ( A ~ - ~ ) X i m ( B ) + i m ( A ~ )  such that for p f % , k E X ,  
A r e @ ,  k)= F,(A, - p,B k) for i = 1, . . . , R. (1 1)  
Then there is a function F:im(A o) X im(B j+im(AR) such that 
ARF@,k) = F(Aop,Sk).  (12) 
Note again that there may be h e a r  mappings A ~ , A R . B  satisfying (12) for some 
belong to sequences of linear factors. 
which do not 
JXG=FnrFM- l  . * . F 1 ,  H = F R F R - I  . . . F , ~ + I .  ThenF=HG. Inameet-in-the-midde 
attack we will need sequences of linear factors ( A o ,  . . . ,Av;Bj,(A’R.AfR -,, . . . ,A’,w;B) for 
G, H - respectively, such that 
A ~ \ I = A ’ M .  
Also note that if (AIR, . . . ,A ’M;E)  is a sequence of linear factors for H-‘ then 
(AIM, . . . ,A‘R;B) is not necessarily a sequence of h e a r  factors for H .  
We need no longer distinguish between sequences of linear factors (140, . . . .AR;B),  
(A’o, . . . ,A‘R;B’) with ker(A,)=ker(A’,) (i =0, . . . ,R), ker(Bj=ker(B’), since they give US 
exactly the same advantage in finding the key. Thus we are m d y  interested in sequences of 
vector spaces (Vo,Y,, . . . ,TrR;%) where V, =ker(A,),%=ker(B) for some sequence of linear 
factors (-40, . . . ,AR;B) .  Such sequences of vector spaces are called Jequences of factor spaces for 
F. The following lemma characterizes these sequences of factor spaces. 
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Lemma 1 . Let Yo, . . . ,‘VR c% , % LX be vccror spaces. Then the following statemenr3 are 
equivalent. 
(i) (To, . . . ,TR;%) is u sequences of factor spaces for F. 
(4 ~I(P+X,k+Y)+~,@,k>~Y, l  
f o r a l l z E ( 1 , .  .. ,R} ,p€% ,kE‘X,xETl-,,yEW. 
hoof: (i)-.(ii). Let (Ao,  . ~ . , A R ; B )  be a sequence of linear factors for F with 
ker(A,)=?T, ( 1  =O, . . . ,R), k.r(B)=%J. It is easy to check, that for i= l ,  . . . ,R,p€%,k€’X;, 
XErt;-L , y € W ,  
A;F,(p+x, k +  y)=A;F,@, k). 
This proves (ii). 
(ii)-+(i). Choose linear mappings Ao,  . . . AR,B such that ker(Ai)=Y; (i =0, . . - ,R), 
ker(B)=%. Define functions F,: h ( A ;  -,)Xim(B)-+ im(A,) (i = 1, . . . ,R) as follows: if 
pEim(AI-1),iEim(B) then choose p,k such that A,-Ip=p,Bk=i and put k.@,i)= A,F,@,k). 
From statement (ii) it follows that the are well-defined (i.e. independent of the choice of p, k) 
and that for p e % , k € X ,  
This proves (i). D 
2.1. SOME GENERALIZATIONS 
Here we briefly mention some ways in which sequences of linear factors can be generalized. 
We have not looked for such general structures in DES. As before, F l ,  . . . ,FR are blockciphers 
and F=FRFR - 1 . . . F1. One possibility is to consider sequences of factors (Ao, . . . ,&;B) 
where A o ,  . . . ,&;B are not necessarily linear mappings satisfying (1 1) for certain functions F,. 
Such sequences can be helpful in cryptanalysis if B is a simple mapping, such as a linear map- 
ping, a mapping composed of low degree polynomials over IFl, etc. 
- 
A second generalization considers sequences of near linear factors. This notion is an exten- 
sion of an idea presented in [Hellman et al761. A sequence of linear mappings (Ao, . . - ,AR;B)  
ih called a sequence of near linear factors for F valid for a set 5 of pairs of plaintexts and keys if 
there are functions f ;  such that for each pair (p,k) in S and each i with l c i < R ,  
where h = p ,  pz =F,(p, - 1 ,k). Suppose that F has a sequence of near linear factors 
(Ao.  . . . , A R ; B )  valid for a set S containing pairs (p,k} for each key k or more generally, that F 
has sequences of linear lactors (Ao, . . . , A R ; B ) ,  all having the same AO,AR,B and valid for sets 
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5 ,, . . . ,S, respectively, such that 5 u . . . u 5, contains pairs @,k) for each k. Then there 
exist a positive number C and a function F such that for each key k, the relations 
1 
C 
are valid for a fraction - of the plaintexts p. If a csyptanalist has C pairs of corresponding 
plaintext and ciphertext, then for each pair @,c) the key can be solved, under the hypothesis that 
(13) holds for the plaintext p. Thus C keys are found, one of which is expected to be the correct 
key. 
A blockcipher F is said to have key clustering if there exist a mapping and a non- 
injective linear mapping B such that for each key k, the relation 
holds for a positive fraction of the plaintexts p. Desmedt, Quisquater and Davio [84] gave a few 
examples of key clustering in blockciphers consisting of at most three rounds of DES. The 
method by which these examples have been constructed can be described in terms of sequences of 
near linear factors as mentioned above. 
3. MEET-IN-THE-MIDDLE AlTACKS ON DES 
Independencies of "bits in the middle'' from key bits in DES, which can be helpful in a 
meet-in-the-middle attack, are the subject of this section. First we give an overview of the map- 
pings used in DES, assuming that the reader is familiar with the NBS description of the Data 
Encryption Standard. (For the complete description, we refer to [NBS 771). In this paper, we 
use a slightly modified version of DES in which IPJP - I  ,PCZ are not used and E,P are com- 
bined to one table EP (cf. Davio et al [83], pp. 184-185). Thus the following mappings are used 
in our version of DES: 
EP:IF:*+F$*: E P x  is formed from x as follows: first y=Px is formed by permuting the 32 bits 
of x; then EPx=Ey is formed by taking 16 of the 32 bits of y once and the other 16 twice; 
Sj:F!-& 0' = 1, . . * ,8): the mappings defined by the S-boxes; 
~ : F ~ 8 ~ ~ ~ 2 : s ( x ) = ( ~ ~ x ~ ,  . . - ,sgXg) for x=(xl, . ' ' ,xa) with XjEff;; 
L,:F:6+F$s (i =1 ,  . . . ,16): L,k=PC2(Cr(')kl,C'(')kz) for k=(kl,k2) with k,,k?Effi*.  Here 
Cx is formed from x by applying a cyclic left shift to the bits of x, r(i) is an integer determined 
by the shift pattern in the NBS-description of the key-scheduling and PCZ(x,y) is formed from 
x,y by selecting 24 bits from x, selecting 24 bits from y and permuting the selected 48 bits in 
some order. 
The mappings EP,Lj are linear. If A is a linear mapping, then we say that A sendsp to q if A 
maps the vector of which only thep-th bit is equal to 1 onto a vectur of which at least the q-th 
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bit equals 1. If A maps the vector with only a 1 in itsp-th bit onto 0, we say that A does not 
choosep. Thus EP sends eachp in {I, . . . ,32} to either one or two elements of {I ,  . . . ,48}, 
while eachp in {I, . . . ,56} 1s either not chosen by L, or sent to exactly one element of 
{I ,  . * .  ,48). 
We shall now algebraically describe our version of DES The message space is @. Ele- 
ments of Fp will be wntten in the form (x,y), where x , y ~ F i ~ .  The key space is FZ6. 
The mappings F , : F ~ X F : 6 - + F ~  (I = 1, . . . ,16) ( the "rounds" ) are defined by 
Thus if Q, Q , . . . are defined by the recurrence sequence 
Let R,M,Tbe integers with I<R<M<T<16. For p,cEFy,kEIF:6, we put 
Our aim is to find out if there are subsets { i l ,  . . . , i64} ,  bl. . . . , j r )  of 
( 1 ,  . . . ,56},( 1, . . . ,64} respectively, such that d',, , . . ,d',,. d",, , . . . ,d",, are functionally 
independent of the key bits k, with i dfferent from i I ,  . . . ,i.7. 
Let p,c have the same meaning as above and put p = ( ~  - l , ~ ) , ~ = ( q ' T , q ' T + l ) .  Define the 
szquences Q - 1  ,qR,W + 1 ,  . . , q'T+i,q'T.q'r-l, . ' by 
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7 
x, - I ( t )=XR(t )= 0 ; X’j-+](t)=X’T(t)= 0 ; 
Xi  + ! ( I )  is the set of indices of the bits of q 
some of the bits of q, with indices in X I ( [ ) ,  some of the bits of q-1 with 
indices in XI - ] ( t )  and eventually k,; 
X’i - is defined similarly in terms of X’i,X’i - .kI. 
which functionally depend on 
Let t € ( I ,  . . . ,56}. We define the sets X , ( t )  (i = R - I,R,R + I ,  . . . ), X’,(t)  
(i = T f  l ,T ,T-  1, . . I ) recursively as follows: 
EF({ 1))- {2,3.4,5,6,8} 
5({2})=(1,3,4,5,7,8} 
9({3})=(2,4,5,6,7,8}  
S((4})=(1,3,5,6,7,8} 
‘ T ( { 5 } ) =  (1,2,3,4,6,7} ~ 
S({6})={1,2,3,5.7,8) ’ S ( 0 ) = 0  
S({7))={1,2,3,4,6,8} I %(A U B ) = F ( A )  U S ( B )  
5({8})={1,2,4,5,6,7) 1 
Obviously, the sets of bits of q, q’, respectively, which are functionally dependent on k, are 
included in X,(t),X’, ( t ) ,  respectively. An equivalent formulation of Meyer’s assumption men- 
tioned in $1 is that ail indices in X,(t),X’,(t) are of bits of q,,q’, whch are functionally dependent 
on k, .  For each r, we shall recursively compute the sets X , ( t ) X z ( r ) .  To this end. we introduce 
the following sets: 
U1={1,2;..,6}, Liz={7, ’ . - , 1 2 } ,  - . . ,  Ui,=(43:..,488), 
vi ={  1,2.3,4}, Yz={5,  . - . , 8 } ,  . . . ,  V 8 = ( 2 9 ,  . - - , 3 2 j .  
Put W,(t)= IZI if Li does not choose t and W,( t )=  0 j if L, sends t to an element of L!,. Finally, 
let 5 be a function, mapping subsets of {I ,  . . . .8) onto subsets of { 1, . . . ,8} which is defined 
as follows: % ( A )  is the set of integers j with the property that there is an i € A  such that EP 
sends an element of V, to an element of U,. In particular, 3( I?)= 0 
table 1: the function 4 
We define the sets V,  - l ( i ) ,VR( l ) ,VRA,( t ) ,  . . ,  , V‘rf,(t).I.”T(t).T/’r-l(t), . 1 .  recur- 
sively as follows: 
Using that lur each S-box in DES, all four output bits functionall! dzpend on all six input bits, 
we obtain 
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Hence the integersj in (1. - - . ,64) such that at least one of the bits d;,d“, (cf. (14) ) depends 
on k, belong to the set 
It is very easy to compute the sets Q(t) ,  using the recurrence relations (16).For each subset I of 
(1, . . . ,56}, the set J of integers in { 1, . . . ,641 not belonging to any of the sets Q(r) with t €1 
has the property that for j E J ,  both d’,,d’>, me functionally independent of the ki with i € 1 .  
The examples for the sets 1,J in the table below have been obtained by computing for each j the 
set of f such that j G Q ( f ) .  N = T - R + 1 denotes the number of consecutive rounds. 
table 1 
In the theorem below we state that non-empty sets I,/ of the same type as in table 2 can 
not be found for blockciphers consisting of 8 or more consecutive rounds of DES. 
Theorem 1 . Suppose rhar R, T are integers with R Z I ,  T <  16. P>K tl. Then for every inreger M 
with R < M  <T and for each f in { 1. . 
Proof: Let t,M be integers with 16f<56,R<M<T. The k q  scheduling of DES has the pro- 
perty that each integer in 11, . . . .56} is chosen by at least one of the mappings Li,L, + 1  for 
i =  { 1, . . , I S ) .  Ths  can be verified by using the fact that the only integers in (1 ,  . . . ,56}  not 
chosen by PC2 are 9,18,22,25,35,38,43,54. Hence if there is an integer not chosen by Li and L, 
then r ( i ) - - r ( j )  must be equal to the difference (mod 28) of two of the integers 9,18,22,25 or of 
two of the integers 35,38,43,54. But r ( i  + 1)-r(i) is either equal to 1 or 2 for i = 1, . . . ,16. 
From the recurrence relations (16) we infer that the sets V R & ~ ( I ) ,  V‘r-z( t )  are non-empty. It is 
. ,56},  Q ( f ) -  { 1. . . . ,64) .  
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easy to check from table 1, that ‘3 
{I ,  . . . ,8} onto (1,  . . . ,8}. Again by (16), we infer that VR + 4 ( f )  = VR + 5 ( t )  
M + l = S T - 4 ,  or M + l = R  + 4  and M = T - 4 .  In these three cases. we have XM(t)UXIM(t)= 
XMtl( t )UX’M+I(t)={l ,  . . .  ,32}. ThisprovesTheorem 1. 0 
Remark. By a similar method as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can show that in case T = R + 6, 
Q(t) can only be a proper subset of (1, . . . ,64) if f is not chosen by both LR and LT. From the 
shift-pattern one recovers that r (R  t6) - - r (R)  is equal to either 11 or 12 for R =1,2, . . . , lo. If 
PC2 i s  made in such a way that no difference of thc integers not chosen by PC2 is congruent to 
1,2,11 or 12 [mod 28) then in Theorem 1 we can replace R + 7  by R t 6 .  We do not know if, by 
a proper choice of PCZ, R f 7  can be replaced by R t5. 
(9 iterated twice) maps each non-empty subset of 
= . . .  - { 1 ; . . , 8 } ,  Vr-4 = V ‘ T - ~  =...=(1;-.,8}. W e h a v e e i t h e r M a R f 4 , o r  
4. SEQUENCES OF FACTOR SPACES IN DES 
In this section we shall investigate the sequences of factor spaces in blockciphers consisting 
of a reduced number of rounds of DES . We shall use the same notation as in the previous sec- 
tions. In particular, the blockciphers F, :IF y X F:6+ 5!4 are defined by F,(qo,qI, k)= 
(q1,w+S(EPql +L!k)) for (qo,ql)EFy and kEF:6, and D E S R , ~ = F ~ F T - I  . . . FR. We shall 
implicitly assume that the sequences of factor spaces we wiU consider are all with respect to 
FR, . . . ,FT. Our aim is to investigate if DESR-T has sequences of ureful factor spaces. (A 
sequence of factor spaces ( V K  - 1 ,YR, . . . ,VT;%) is called useful if %#[O] and YT#F~). 
Example 1. Let t E { 1, . . . ,56} and let X ,  - l ( r ) ,  .YR(z), . . . be the sets recursively d e h d  
by (15). Let 7, be the spaces of vectors of whch the bits with indices outside 
Y , ( t ) = K ( t )  U j >32:/ -32 E X, + l ( t )  i 
are 0 and let % be the space generated by the vector in Fi6  of wbch only the t-th bit is e q d  to 
1. Then (VR - ~ , ? T R ,  . . . ,%7,;45) is a sequence of factor spaces for DESRJ and t h ~ s  equence is 
useful if and only if YT(t) is properly contained in { I ,  . . ,64}. 
Example 2. Reeds and ManferdeLli [84] introduced the notion of a “per round linear fac- 
tor” for DES. A per round linear factor is a linear mapping A on Fy for which there exist a 
mapping s with AEPS = i A .  If there exists a per round linear factor A which is neither inverti- 
ble nor has the property that A E maps each vector to 0 then one can prove that (V, . . . ,pc,%) is 
a useful sequence of factor spaces for DESR,T. where 
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If Y,%, are subspaces of Fp,F;8 respectively, then the spaces SP(Y),SK(Q) are defined by 
SP(Y) = [(Vl ,vo + S(EPv1 +c) + s (c)):(vo,v1) E Y,c E F:*] , 
SK(%) = [(O, s (u+ c) + s (c)):u E G2L ,c  E F481 . 
Lemma 2 . k t  VR - I ,  "iR, . . 
ments are equivalent: 
, VT c F 24, 6l.U c F :6 be vector spaces. Then the following stufe- 
(1) (VR - I,YR, - . . ,VT;%) is a sequence of linear factors for D E S R J ;  
(ri) sP(y;-l)+SK(~(~))C?ifori=R,R+l, . . .  ,T.  
Proof: In view of Lemma 1, it suffices to show that for i = R,R + 1. . . . ,T, 
Denote the right-hand side of (19) by '%Ii. Let i E { R, . . . , T } .  It is easy to check that for 
(vo ,v1) € Y, c € 
(v,, VO + S (EPvI + C) + S (c) = F,(vo ,v1, k) + Fz (0,O. k), 
where kEIFz6 is chosen such that L,k=c. This shows that 
SP(Vi -I)L%,. 
It is also easy to verify that for WEW,CEIF;*, 
(0,s (L,w + c)+ S (c)) =F,(O,O, k +  w) + F,(O, O,k), 
where again k€F:6 is chosen such that L,k=c. Hence 
where 
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Hence 
06, LSP(Y, -I)+sK(L,(.!)). 
A combination of (20),(21),(22) yields (19). 0 
In the statement of the next lemma, we use the following notation. Defme the h e a r  map- 
phg p , : ~ ; s , ~ q ,  ,-,;:IF~-.F:~, p:' :F$+@, U : F ~ ~ + I F : ~  as follows: 
P,(X)=X, for X=(X1. ' . + ,xg) with XI. . . . .Xs ; 
p:(y)=(O, . . . ,O,y,O, . . - ,0) (with y on the i-th place) , 
P;' (Y) = (0, P I  (Y)) ; 
U(x,y) =EPy . 
Finally, for any subspace %. of F$, we define the spaces TJ(%),T,(?X} C, = 1, . . . ,8) by 
q(%)=[s,(u+c)+ S,(c):u €%c€E6,] , 
T/(%) = [S,(u + c )  + S,(C) + s, (u) -1 s/ (0):u E 9L c E IF;] 
and 
ROOT: We shall only prove (23); (24) can be proved in a similar way. For convenience, we intro- 
duce the following notation: 
First of all we remark, that for subspaces 5-] ,%'2 of iF y .  
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and that for subspaces %1,%2 of F;, 
Tj(%1 +%2)=7“, (“1Ll)+T‘ , (GU2)  for j = 1, . . . ,8 .  
(25 )  follows easily from the identity 
s(v’0 +V”O,V’] +Y1,c)=S(v’o,v’1 , C + E P V ” ~ ) + S ( V ” ~ , V ” ,  ,c) 
for (vfo, V1), (vrP0, v”l ) E Fy c E F:8, 
while (26) is an easy consequence of the identity 
Ln view of (25),(26), it suffices to prove (23) for p =  1. Let ‘f=[(vo,v,)] and put 
From the identity 
it follows easily that 
On the other hand we have 
--YL S P ( Y ) .  (29) 
Let deIF; and choose c € F i 8  such that p,(c)=d,pk(c)=O for k f j .  Then (27) implies that 
GI ~ ~ ‘ ( 7 7  for j = I ,  - - - ,8. 
Now (23) follows at once from (28),(29),(30). 0 
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Lemma 3 shows that for each subspace Y of F y  ( % of F:6) the space S P ( v ) , ( S K ( % ) )  
can be expressed as the sum of a space generated by a set of vectors of which the cardinality is 
not larger than the dimension of Y (W ) and spaces whch can be described completely in terms 
of the S-boxes. Thus Lemma 3 provides us a rather efficient method which checks if a given 
sequence of spaces (V, - 1 ,VR, . . . ,Yr,Q.ii) is a sequence of factor 
arguments used in the proof of Lemma 3 it is clear, that this method can be applied also to a 
general class of block ciphers which can be described in the same way as DFS, with arbitrary S- 
boxes (which can be diflerent in each round), an arbitrary linear mapping instead of EP (where it 
is allowed that in different rounds dfierent linear mappings are chosen) and arbitrary surjective 
linear mappings instead of the L, . 
for DESRJ. From the 
We shall now give explicit expressions for the spaces Sp(rC) , SK(%l). For this purpose we 
have only to compute the spaces T'(%) with C%L c F ~ .  
Lemma 4 . For all g in { 1, . . . ,8} and all subspaces % ofF$ wirh %#it101 we have 
T,~u)= T',(GL~)=F$, with thefollowing exceprions: 
r,([oooool])=[ 1100,001 I ,  lolo] , r;([000001])=[ 1lU0,OOl I] ; 
r4([101iiol) = T ' ~ ( [  101 I 101) = 1 I O I O , ~  10 11 ; 
T4([ 101 1 1 I]) = T 4 ( [  10 1 1 1 11) = [ 1001 ,o 1 lo] ; 
T4([000001, 101 1 lo]) = T',([000001,1011 lo]) - [ 1 100,oo 1 1, lolo] . 
Proof: This can be verified by straightforward computation. 0 
In the theorem below, the sets S '(T ),S K(?U ), with T,W being subspaces of F!4,E18 
respectively, are defined by 
Theorem 2 . Let 'V;U be subspacer of IF y,ff $8 resprcfivsli Then 
where 
-?= [(v,  ,vo )]:I VO, v 1 ) E '-1 <f p4 crc?-)#[ooooo I ] , 
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Ifp4U(y)=[OooOol] ; 
and where 
vg = p y  IF fur g E 5 (rv7 
with the following exceptions If 4 E 5 '(o: 
( a )  SKpJJ)= 2 , 
g E 5 KYb) 
where Wg =priF$ for g E S  Ke%) with the following exceptions rf4ES K('W). 
Proof: The proofs of (i),(ii) can be derived easily from Lemmas 3,4. We shall only give a rough 
sketch of the proof of (i). By Lemma 4, 
(YI , YO + S ( E P v ~  ) + S (0)) = (V, ,YO f U) if P ~ E P v ~  ~ 0 0 0 0 0  1 ,
These facts immediately prove (i). 0 
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We shall now prove that blockciphers consisting of eight or more consecutive rounds of 
DES are resistant against a meet-in-the-middle attack using sequences of factor spaces. To this 
end we shall need the following lemma. 
Lemma 5 .  Let T > R  +3. If('l'~ - 1 ,VR, 
with 'X#[OL h e n  
. . ,'VT;W) is a sequence of factor spaces for D E S R , ~  
Proof: (ii) is an immediate consequence of (i) and Lemmas 2,4. We shall now prove (i). Since 
all elements of { 1, . . . ,56) are chosen by at least one of the mappings LR.LR + I ,  at least one of 
the spaces S K ( L ~ ( % ) ) , S K ( L ~  + 1 ('Id) is #"[I. By Lemma 2 and Theorem 2, 
for some non-empty subset 5 of { I ,  
%' being a subspace of F: with %#[O] in case that 4 6 5 .  The space "7' has the property that 
for each j in { 1, . . . ,4} there is a vector x l x 2 X J . I ( 4  in .2' with x,#. EP sends the indices of 
the output bits of S-box S, (i.e the elements of { 4 j  -3, . . . ,4 j } )  to the indices of the input bits 
of 6 different S-boxes, namely the S-boxes Sk with k EF(lj}), where 9 is the function defined in 
table 1. Together with Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 these facts imply that 
. . ,8}, where =pi*(Fi) if g#4 and with 
where ; V i = p i ' ( I F i )  for g+4 and when 4 ~ 4 ( 5 ) ,  Yi=p;*('?12) for some subspace Q2 of F$ with 
-ZL2+[0]. We remark that 
sP(p;.(~i))>py(IF:) f o r g  =2,3.5,7,8, (31) 
hence "It2 =IF; if one of the numbers 2,3.5,7,8 belongs to 5 .  Since ?(S) has cardinality at least 
6, at least one of the numbers 2,3.5,7,8 belongs to 4(,5). By repeating the argument from above, 
and using that F 2  maps each non-empty subset of (1, . . . ,8} onto { 1. . . . ,8} , we obtam 
Ths completes the proof of Lemma 5.  0 
Lemma 5 includes the result of Meyer mentioned in 91. Another consequence of Lemma 5 
is that the only per round linear factors of DES are the linear mappings A : F ~ * + [ F ~ *  for which 
either A is invertible or .4E maps each vector of Fz2 onto 0. (cf. example 2 at the beginning of 
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this section.) This fact was already proved by Reeds and Manferdelli [84]. 
We shall now prove our final result. 
Theorem 3 .  LetR,M,Tbeintegers  wirh I<R<MGT<16 andT>R+7.  Let 
(rf~ - 1,  V R ,  . . ’ , vLw ;%), ( ? b - ’ ~ ,  Tr - 1,  . . . , V‘M ;%) be sequences of factor spaces for 
DESR,M,DESG$ 1 , ~ .  respeczively, such that ?tY#[O] and c t - , ~  =77,w. Then 
Rook In the proof we shall use that the inverse of a round of DES (i.e. one of the blockciphers 
F,) is equal to the round itself, except that the left half and the right half of both plaintext and 
ciphertext must be interchanged. 
We distinguish three cases: (i) M > R  +4; (ii) M S T - 5 :  (iii) M = R  - 3 = T - 4 .  In case (i) 
we have YM IF$^, by Lemma 5,  (3). In case (ii) we can probe. completely similar to Lemma 5, 
(ii), that ’VM =IF:4, using that all elements of { 1, . . . ,561 are chosen by at least one of the map- 
pings L , L T - , .  In case (iii) we have firstly. by Lernma S,(i), .?-.w=.-<R - 3  2 [(O,y):y~F:*l. By 
an argument completely similar to the proof of Lemma 5 (i). one has Y=V’T-~ 2 
[ (+ ,O):XEF~~] .  This completes the proof of Theorem 3. 0 
Remark. By changing PCZ in the way described at the end of 63, it is possible to replace 
the condition T> R + 7 by T> R + 6 in Theorem 3. This can be proved in a similar way as 
Theorem 3. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Linear structures allowing known-plaintext attacks on blockciphers have been investigated, 
particularly those consisting of a reduced number of consecutive rounds of DES. The first struc- 
tures we looked for were “bits in the middle” independent of key bits. Such independencies were 
found only in blockciphers comprising less than eight rounds of DES. We discovered that PC2 
was not optinid in the x~lse that by a change of PC2 blockciphers of seven instead of eight con- 
secutive rounds of DES would have no “bits in the middle” independent of key bits. The 
existence of such independencies in blockciphers for such numbers of rounds depends only on the 
structure of the tables E. P. and P C 2 ;  these independencies would hold for any S-boxes. More 
general linear structures were also considered, namely sequences of h e a r  factors. The existence 
of these factors depends not only on the structure of E, P, and P C 2 .  but also on the structure of 
the S-boxes. In spite of some h e a r  structure in S-box 4, we were abIe to show that blockciphers 
consisting of eight or more consecutive rounds of DES do not have sequences of linear factors 
with respect to these rounds that can reduce the search time for the key in a meet-in-the-middle 
attack. 
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A natural extension of the attacks described in this paper would seek changes in the tables 
defining the S-boxes that yield S-boxes with linear factors cooperating to give useful sequences of 
linear factors. (One might even change the S-boxes hfferently in Werent rounds.) Any 
sequence of linear factors for the cipher with the modified S-boxes is then a sequence of ‘‘near’’ 
linear factors for the original cipher. (As has been pointed out Ln $2, such attacks generalize 
several ideas in [Hellman et al 761 and [Desmedt, Quisquater and Davio 841.) In this way one 
might obtain sequences of near linear factors that allow cryptanalysis of blockciphers consisting 
of eight or more rounds of DES. 
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